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FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NEW ADMINISTRATION
Speech of Senator Mike Mansfia ld (D., Montana) to b ~
Duqu~sne University Law Alumni Banquet
Monday, April 24, 1961
8 p.m.
Pittsb~rgh, Pennsylvania

d~liv a r~d

at the

The r e sponsibility for the conduct of our relations with
other nations rests only uith the Administration in power.

The

President ass umes this r-asponsibility \lhen he takas offica on January
20th. But foreign policy does not
tion and begin
four years.

ane'~

com~

\<lith the next.

to an end with ona Administra-

Tha slate is not wiped clean

ev ~ ry

There is a cont;.nuity of the problems 11h ich confront the

nation from abroad and a continuity of the
to these problems from one

Ad~inistration

of Ol' r government

respons~s

to another.

This is not to say that a partic : lar Administration will not
stamp the course of foreign policy with the brand of its own ideas.
The process, however, is a
problems which we

fac~

slo~

one .

It is

slo~

abroad are not of our

partly bacausa the

exclusiv~

hence, are not amenable to our exclusive remedias.
slo,., because the impact of the ideas of a
meate a

larg~

ne'~

creation and,

And, partly, it is

Administration must per-

and compl ~x bureaucracy Hithin o Jr m·m government before

they make themselves felt in action on the problems to ,,hich they are
directed.
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We can grasp the significance of this continuity in foreign
policy by reference to recent events in Cuba and in Laos.

In the one

instance, President Kennedy had urged an Alliance for Progress of all
the American Republics.

Within this concept, he presented a broad and

cohesive outline for a cooperative advance in the relations of the
nations of the Western Hemiephere.

The presentation was well - received

by other Republics of the Americas.

New vistas of common benefit were

opened by it.
Nevertheless, within tiinety days of the President's taking
office we were not yet at the beginning of this peaceful advance but
rather face-to-face with a military crisis in Cuba brought about by
the launching of an invasion of anti - Castro forces.

Instead of being

in a position to move forward on a new constructive approach to all of
Latin America, the Administration was compelled to direct its attention
to a critical juncture in our relations with one nation of the region.
This juncture

~vas

reached during this Administration.

the roads leading to it began many months ago.

But

The juncture represented

the culmination of an accumulation of hostility on the part of Cuba to
this nation and an accumulation of our responses to that hostility.
On the other side of the globe, in Laos, something similar
has transpired.

In fact, this situation had already reached the point

of crisis even before the new Administration took office.

It had reached
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this stage because in preceding years a peaceful land, once remote
from the rest of the world, had been turned into a bone of contention
in the larger cla:>h of ideologies and po,.,er elsewhere in the world.
As a result the people of Laos who until recent years had scarcely
ever heard a shot fired in anger found themselves the focal point
of steadily converging military forces from outside.

Military clashes

in Laos which produced the immediate crisis involved but a handful of
men.

But these clashes opened fissures vlith large implications for

,.rorld peace.
The direct involvement of the Soviet Union in Laos as a
supplier of military aid to Laotian factions was one factor in produc ing the crisis and a factor of comparatively recent vintage.

But it

was preceded by the involvement of the Chinese - supported North
Vietnamese government for a long time in a similar role.

The sum total

of this outside corr.munist - involvement in the local Laotian situation
and its progressive enlargement is not measurable.

But our own progres-

sive involvement will give us some insight into the process by ,.,hich
the Laotians were plucked from the obscurity of remote Southeast Asia
and steadily moved into a focus of

world-to~ide

significance.

(.Jhen I first visited Laos in 1953, there were only 2 American.
junior officials in the entire country. There was no aid program to
and,
speak of/ may I add, no Laotian army to speak of, to aid . But
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seven years later, by the time the Laotian crisis broke in full force
in the very last days of the Eisenhower Administration, there were in
Laos hundreds of

u.s.

officials of several agencies and departoents.

We had expended hundreds of millions of dollars on aid, largely for
military purposes.
soldiers.

We had financed the training of thousands of Laotian

And, finally, our

O\~

naval and other forces had converged in

the general vicinity of Laos because of the steady advance of communistoriented Laotians in the country .

This vast commitment of our resources,

not unlike that cf th2 Communists, had little to do with either the needs
or realities of the situation in Laos.

It had much to do with winning

hollow propaganda victories in the cold war .
To this situation, too, President Kennedy brought new ideas.
In specifics he worked with the United Kingdom and India in an effort
to bring about a cease-fire and the neutralization of Laos .
words, he sought to take Laos out of the co l d war.

In other

Left to their own

devices, the Laotian people would ask for nothing more.

From the point

of view of the great powers this solution would mark a significant step
towards a mor e rational world situation, one which anyone of them could
take in the interests of peace with little, if any, sacrifice of significant
national interests.

-sThe initial Soviet reacticn to this proposal seemed favorable
enough.

Hevertheless, in the uorking out of the details through the

existing channels of cl.iplonacy, veeks of delay have ensued.
All the uhile, professions of the desire for peace in Laos
have continued and all the uhile, the fighting has continued in that
country.

All the ,.,hile, the jockeying for some assumed advantage has

gone on by much the same responses 'l'rith 'l'rhich this situation has been
dealt for years.
The crises in Laos and Cuba reveal vividly the continuity
of both the problems and responses in foreign policy and the difficulties of altering either overnight.

Hithout uishing to

dovrngrade the

seriousness of either situation, I must emphasize, however, that they
are but a fractional part of a larger picture.

Behind Cuba stands the

vast panorama of continuing difficulties and a continuing inadequacy
of response to them Hith respect to all of Latin America.

Yet this far

more significant picture ca.l'l be overlooked in a fixation on the sensational developments ''ithin the troubled island just ninety miles off
our shores.

He have managed to live ''lith a militantly hostile Cuba

for tvro years.

I do not believe vre could live very well for tuo days

vith a militantly hostile latin Al!lerica.
Yet, vrhat has happened in Cuba under Castro can occur in
other Latin American countries.

The seed of Castroism is compounded

of ruthless totalitarian technique plus messianic indigenous leadership,
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plus support from outside this Hemisphere.

It is doubtful that this

seed can grow except in the soil of social and economic discontent.
Unfortunately such soil covers much of Latin America, from the Caribbean
shores down the great spine of the Andes.
It is at least conceivable that this Hemisphere can be insulated
from
from a flow/without of mater ial support to totalitarian forces within
but the task would be immensely difficult and costly and of only limited
e fficacy.

It is not conceivable, hm-rever, that in this day and age of

instant and easy communications, this Hemisphere can be isolated from
the transference of totalitarian techniques from elsewhere.

Nor can

the appearance of messianic indigenous leadership in Latin American
countries be forestalled because what is indigenous to Latin America is
by definition beyond the control of this nation.
If it is to our interests-"and it is--to prevent the spread of
a d).visive

and hostile totalitarianism throughout the Hemisphere, there

is one point at which a check may be feasible.

That point is where a

cooperative effort with others renders the soil of the Americas infertile
to the seed of totalitarianism before it takes root .

And in substance,

that is the idea which the President expressed in such comprehensive
form a fel-7 weeks ago in his speech on an Alliance for Progress in the
I.Jestern Hemisphere.

It is one thing to advance this idea.

It is another

to bring it to fruition--to promote that economic and social progress
which alone promises the removal of the acids of mass discontent from
the soil of this

He~isphere.
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There uas much to do .1ith respect to social and economic
conditions in Latin Amarica before this Administration took offica.
After the recent davelopments in Cuba there is still much to do.
was short when this Administration took over.

Now it may

If the situation in Latin America is to

b~

b~

Time

even shorter.

altarad so that it

will no longar provida an incubus for totalitarianism then a great affort
m'JSt be made along the lines of tha allianca for progress proposal \-lhich
the Presidant has advancad and that effort mJ st begin to take concreta
for m in the very near futu:re.

The effort, moreover, must ba a coopera-

tive one because the stake of Latin Amaricans is far greater and more
direct than our

0~10

and, in great part, tha situation is amenable to

change only as Latin Americans are viill:l.ng to change it.

But if thay

are willing to do what must be done for freedom and progress within
their own countries, then the stake of this nation in the future of this
He·1isphere is such that vie must bG prepared to join with them in the
effort.

I know that the President is so prepared.

also prepar ad ?
face

th~

If wa, no less than the Latin

Are the rest of us

Am ~ricans,

are willing to

dimensions of the difficulties and act in concert on them, than

the Presid ant's ideas of an Alliance for Prograss can be and will ba interpret~d

into effective action .
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Not unlilce Cuba, the crisis in laos is but the visible tip of
a vast iceberg involving the mainland of lfestern Asia.

It is not only

in Laos that the conditions of peace do not yet r;xist .

We may see them,

there,now in striking form.

But if we look beneath the tip, ue will

see that the difficulties which confront us, particularly, fork out from
Laos into Thailand and even more so into Viet Nam.
the sea off Southeast Asia.

Nor do they and at

The conditions of peace in any reliable sense

do not exist at Fonnosa or in Korea any more than in Viet Nam or Laos.
In all of these situations, the ne't-r Administration begins with what may
best be described as the response of the holding action.

Such stability

as exists in them, in part, is knitted together with huge aid-programs
of one kind or another, backed with a heavy deployment of our own military
forces in the general area.
At best, these situations will remain uncertain for some time
to come.

At best, the response which we have heretofore given to them

will have to be continued for some time to come.

It is not yet clear to

what extent these situations can be altered in the direction of a more
durable and less costly peace by

n~re

effective diplomacy but I am con-

fident that the President will not hesitate to bring to bear ne"t-r ideas
to that

end.

l-ie shall not kno't-r the possibilities until ideas have been

tested and, I may add, that this testing has already begun in Laos.
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It will be a cautious process - -this testing- -because the
Pr ~ sid3nt

nation.
forth .

is a prudent man who has uppermost in mind the security of this
It will be a slow process for reasons which I have already set

But if it is possible to achieve a more stable and less costly

peace in the Far East, I know that the President will leave no stone unturned in his efforts tv achieve it.
What applies to Latin America and to the Southeast Asia and the
Far East, applies also to Europe and to Africa.

We have been involved

deeply in the problems of the former for a long time.

In the last year

or two we have become involved significantly in the problems of the
latter.

I shall not, today, go into the details of the situation which

confronts us on these continents.

Nevertheless, I would point out by

way of example that the division of Berlin and Germany has not disappeared
with the advent of a new Administration.

Nor have the weaknesses in NAXO

dissolved merely because we have installed a new President .

Nor have

the Eastern European nations yet obtained that degree of national freedom of
action which permits a full measure of contact with Western Europe, a condition which must prevail if there is to be a sound peace on that continent.
I shall not go into detail, either, on the vastly complicated
problems of trying to bring control over the weapons of mass destruction
and a measure of r eduction in the great burden of taxation on our people
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and all peoples vrhich is entailed in bilhons upon billions of armaments
expenditures.
took office.

These problems

vrere

complex on the day this Administration

They grov more complex as each day passes 1-ri thout the be-

ginnings of a solution.
As with Latin America and Southeast Asia, the President may be
expected to bring to bear
policy which he inherits.

nevr

ideas on all of these problems of foreign

Indeed, some ideas already have been initiated.

The process of making these ideas effective, however, is, as I have already
noted, at best a slow one.

After years of close observation, moreover, I

am .personally persuaded that the machinery o:f this process

vri thin

the

Executive Branch of this government has grown so cumbersome and ineffective
that there is grave danger to the principle of responsible leadership by
the President.

I would hope, therefore, that this Administration would

proceed promptly to a thorough overhaul of the machinery of intelligence
which functions in many Departments and Agencies in a fashion vrhich deeply
influences foreign policy and its conduct.
I 1·rould hope, further, that the machinery for the countless
secondary decisions of policy through which the President's ideas and
-t.(_,~

primary

decisions~ would

be thoroughly overhauled and streamlined and

that the preponderant responsibility in these matters 1·rould be lodged
,.,here i t has not been for many years--in the office of the Secretary of
State.

..
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The difficulties which ,.,e face in the world are immense.
The responsibility of the President in connection "lith them are
enormous.

He carries the ultimate burden for all of us - Democrats

and Republicans alike.

He has a right to expect general support in

these matters, a support which must include, may I say, constructive
criticism in matters of foreign policy.
I want to say that he has had that kind of support in Congress
for the first three months that he has been in office.
from Democrats and Republicans alike .

He has had it

I am confident that he has it

and ,.,ill continue to have it from the people of the U•1ited States .

